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11 Introduction
Since Hardy, Littlewood and P¶ olya (1929, 1934, 1952), mathematician economists
have demonstrated the equivalence that prevails between inequality measures, do-
minance between income distributions and transfer principles. Accordingly, a wide
literature as been devoted to such transfers aiming at proposing some well-suited
measures of inequality as well as deriving, by means of decision theory, the behavior
of decision maximizers under risk and uncertainty (see e.g. Chateauneuf, Gajdos,
Wilthien (2002)).
In the spirit of Dalton's transfer (1920), Kolm (1976) proposed the diminishing
transfer principle, which postulates that an income transfer, valued to be ± > 0 from
a higher-income individual to a lower-income one, yields a better impact on social
welfare indices insofar as incomes (x) are the lowest possible, given that individuals'
ranking remains unchanged after such transfers. However, as mentioned by Mehran
(1976) and Kakwani (1980), these transfers do not involve the di®erence between
individuals' ranks. Hence, they propose the transfer sensitivity property : a transfer
of amount ± > 0 occurring at the lower part of the distribution is preferable to
a transfer of the same amount at the upper part of the distribution if rank gaps
between donors and recipients are equal. The problem is that anything guarantees
that income gaps are also equal. In this respect, Chateauneuf et al. (2002) suggest
the strong diminishing transfer principle : a transfer of amount ± > 0 occurring at
the bottom of the distribution is preferable to a transfer of amount ± > 0 at the top
of the distribution if rank gaps and income gaps between donors and recipients are
equivalent.
Other principles have been proposed, developing some new transfer concepts such
as Fleurbaey and Michel's (2001) proportional transfer principle, exhibiting a small
loss in the transfer between the donor and the recipient, or Gajdos's (2004) ®¡spread,
simulating global changes in a distribution with simultaneous progressive transfers
(from one higher-income agent to all lower-income ones) and simultaneous regressive
transfers (from the same agent to all higher-income ones) in order to obtain the
implications on the decision maker's behavior.
Without exploring new transfer principles, let us now suppose that transfers may
occur between individuals that belong to di®erent groups of the population or equi-
valently between two distinct populations.
Figure 1. Transfer from Population 1 to Population 2
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2When a progressive transfer is performed from a higher-income individual of Po-
pulation 1 to a lower-income one of Population 2, many questions arise. How can we
measure inequalities between two groups and which inequality-reducing transfers can
be characterized?
In order to tackle these di±culties, we specify particular Pigou-Dalton principles :
within-group and between-group transfers. The literature is not totally silent about
this topic. On the one hand, inequality measure decompositions, such as entropy
or Gini measures (see e.g. Rao (1969), Pyatt (1976), Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1978),
Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980), Cowell (1980), Silber (1989), Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1991), Dagum (1997), Wodon (1999), Aaberge, Steinar, Doksum (2005)
among others) yield some theoretical issues aiming at bringing out within-group and
between-group measures of inequalities. However, these are derived without invoking
neither within-group nor between-group transfer axioms. Indeed, transfers are taking
into account in order to demonstrate that overall inequality declines with progressive
transfers without considering the impacts on within- and between-group inequalities.
On the other hand, related topics have been studied since the 80's, that of distance
between distributions (initiated by Dagum (1980), Ebert (1984), and Chakravarty and
Dutta (1987)), that of polarization (see e.g. Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004)) and
that of deprivation (see e.g. Ebert and Moyes (2000)). Transfers are partly excluded
from these researches, hence, some clarifying proposals may be advanced to propose
intuitive between-group transfers. This is precisely the aim of this paper.
We ¯rst introduce between-group and within-group transfers (Section 2). We axio-
matically derive Gini's mean di®erence (Gini (1912)) and Dagum's Gini index between
two populations (Dagum (1987)). Accordingly, we show the implications of between-
group transfers on : Dagum's between-group Gini index, the multivariate majorization
ordering, and the multivariate Lorenz ordering with zonotope inclusions (Section 3).
An application is performed with the Gini decomposition in order to understand the
impact of within- and between-group transfers on the variations of the overall Gini
index (Section 4). A conclusion follows to highlight the debate between the use of en-
tropy and Gini measures throughout the prism of decomposition techniques (Section
5).
2 Between-group and Within-group Transfers
Notations. Let D be the set of all income distributions D :=
S
n2N¤ Rn, D+ being
the nonnegative part of D, and D++ its positive part. Let X := (x1;:::;xi;:::;xn),
Y := (y1;:::;yi;:::;ym) 2 D+, be two rank-ordered discrete income distributions :
x1 · x2 · ::: · xn, y1 · y2 · ::: · ym, with n;m 2 N¤ and ei be the n-tuple
(0;:::;0;1;0;:::;0) whose only non-zero element occurs at the i-th rank of X (e ei
being the m-tuple of Y ); N¤ being the set of positive integers. ­ is the set of positive
3rank-ordered income distributions with equal sizes. I : D+ ¡! R+ is an inequality
measure and Ib : D+ £ D+ ¡! R+ a between-group inequality measure.
De¯nition 2.1: Pigou-Dalton Transfer. A distribution is obtained from X 2
D+ by a progressive transfer, if a transfer of amount ± > 0 occurs from a higher-
income individual xi to a lower-income one xj (that is, xi > xj), letting their position
unchanged : xi¡1 · xi ¡ ± and xj + ± · xj+1. An index of inequality I satis¯es the
Pigou-Dalton principle (PD) if :
I (X + (ej ¡ ei)±) · I(X): (PD)
Now, let us de¯ne a transfer between members of two distinct populations.
De¯nition 2.2: Between-group Pigou-Dalton Transfer. Let X;Y 2 D+ be two
non-identical income distributions, for which a progressive transfer of amount ± > 0
occurs from xi to yj, such that xi > yj, xi¡1 · xi ¡±, yj +± · yj+1. A between-group
inequality index Ib(X;Y ) is said to be consistent with the Between-group Pigou-Dalton
principle (BPD) if :
Ib (X ¡ ±ei;Y + ±e ej) · Ib(X;Y ): (BPD)
This axiom is quite intuitive. If an income donor of X transfers a part of his
income to a member of Y , then the income inequality (e.g. the income di®erence)
between the two individuals are lower. On this basis, the BPD axiom postulates that
the overall between-group inequalities decline. This will become clearer in Section 5,
where it is shown that well-known between-group inequality measures violate BPD.
In a di®erent manner, if a within-group Pigou-Dalton transfer occurs, that is, a
transfer between members of a same group, letting their position unchanged within
their own group, we require the between-group index is sensitive after such transfers.
De¯nition 2.3: Within-group Pigou-Dalton Transfer. Let X;Y 2 D+ and
suppose a progressive Pigou-Dalton transfer of amount ± > 0 occurs within X from
xi to xj, such that xi > xj, xj + ± · xj+1, xi¡1 · xi ¡ ±. A between-group inequality
index Ib(X;Y ) respects the Within-group Pigou-Dalton principle (WPD) if :
Ib (X + (ej ¡ ei)±;Y ) · Ib(X;Y ): (WPD)
Remark that many variants of this transfer may be introduced such that the
sensitiveness of Ib when a transfer occurs only in Y from yr to yh, such that yr > yh,
yh + ± · yh+1, yr¡1 · yr ¡ ± :
Ib (X;Y + (e eh ¡ e er)±) · Ib(X;Y ): (WPD1)
As a corollary of WPD and WPD1, we require that :
Ib (X + (ej ¡ ei)±;Y + (e eh ¡ e er)±) · Ib(X;Y ): (WPD2)
4The intuition underlying these transfers is depicted in Figure 2 infra. Precisely,
after a WPD1 transfer of amount ± > 0 between y1 and y2, the poorest individual
of P2 with income x1 is less distant from P1 since his income is closer to y1 + ±
and y2 ¡ ± than to y1 and y2. In this situation, it makes sense to record a decrease
of between-group inequalities. On the contrary, after a transfer of amount ± > 0
between y3 and y4, the person with income x2 may feel indi®erent since she is closer
to y4 ¡ ± but she is more far-o® from y3 + ±. In the light of this, it seems reasonable
to pay a particular attention to these between-group inequality measures, which are
decreasing after within-group transfers, whereas we will see in Section 5 that many
between-group indices are always invariant.
Figure 2. Transfers within Population 1
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3 Characterization of Dagum's Between-group Gini index
In order to gauge the impact of within- and between-group transfers on between-
group inequalities, we use the traditional axioms of the literature to derive Dagum's
Gini index between two groups (see Dagum (1987)), G : D+£D+ ¡! [0;1]. We make
this derivation in two times. We ¯rst derive the absolute version of the between-group
Gini index (homogeneous of degree one), and then, the relative version (homogeneous
of degree zero). For this purpose, let us before expose di®erent axioms.
Axiom 3.1: Invariance. Let X;Y 2 D+, and 1x, 1y be column vectors of ones with
sizes equal to the number of rows in X and Y , respectively. For all ± 2 R++,
Ib(X + ±1x;Y + ±1y) = Ib(X;Y ): (INV)
Axiom 3.2: Linear Homogeneity. Let X;Y 2 D+. For all ¸ 2 R++,
Ib(¸X;¸Y ) = ¸Ib(X;Y ): (LIN)
Axiom 3.3: Normalization. Let X, Y 2 D+. For all X = Ox := (0;0;:::;0) and
Y = 1y,
Ib(X;Y ) = 1: (NM)
5Axiom 3.4: Symmetry. For all X, Y 2 D+,
Ib(X;Y ) = Ib(Y;X): (SM)
Axiom 3.5: Population Principle. Let X, Y 2 D+ and X(t), Y (t) obtained after
concatenating X and Y , t times. For all t 2 N¤ n f1g,
Ib(X
(t);Y
(t)) = I(X;Y ): (PP)
Axiom 3.6: Pair-based Decomposition 1. Let X;Y 2 D+. For all xi 2 X and
yr 2 Y :







where i;j relates all pairwise combinations between i 2 f1;2;:::;ng and j 2 f1;2;:::;mg,
and f(¢) is continuous and increasing.1
The concept of pair-based inequality measures (see Kolm (1999)), enables all pairwise
income di®erences to be computed.2 From these measures, we address the pair-based
decomposition axiom, which is di®erent from other decomposition properties we ¯nd
in the literature of inequality measurement (see Shorrocks (1980)) or mobility mea-
surement (see e.g. Fields and Ok (1996)). This axiom postulates that each person
compares her income with each other. This may be viewed as a focus axiom, in which
each person feels deprived from higher-income individuals only (see e.g. Bossert and
D'Ambrosio (2006)). But in this case, we have a symmetric focus since each person
of X compares her situation with higher-income individuals of Y and each person of
Y makes the same comparison with members of X. Alternatively, this may be inter-
preted with a concern for envy : each person of X may envy some individuals of Y
and may simultaneously be envied by members of Y (see e.g. Fleurbaey (2006)).
Theorem 3.1 An absolute between-group inequality index Ib satis¯es INV, LIN, SM,





r=1 jxi ¡ yrj
nm
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Statistically, the Gini Mean Di®erence (Gini (1912)) between two populations
yields the expected income gap between two individuals drawn at random with re-
placement, one from X and the other from Y .
1Remark that f can be seen as an averaging function or a normalization function. Indeed, in
other frameworks, it would be possible to impose some restrictions on f such that symmetry, with
f(x;:::;x) = x, and f(x1 + y1;:::;xn + yn) = f(x1;:::;xn) + f(y1;:::;yn), see Acz¶ el (1966, p.
239). Note, in this case, that NM may not be independent from DEC1.
2This concept serves to analyze rank-preserving transfer principles and to de¯ne intensive and
extensive measures of income inequality, see Kolm (1999, p. 53-57).
6For the purpose of deriving the relative between-group Gini index, let us introduce
the following axioms.
Axiom 3.7: Ratio Scale Invariance. Let X;Y 2 D+. For all ¸ 2 R++,
Ib(¸X;¸Y ) = Ib(X;Y ): (RS)
As a consequence of NM and RS, we obtain a stronger axiom of normalization.
Axiom 3.8: Strong Normalization. Let X;Y 2 D+ with X = Ox, and Y = 1y.
For all e 2 R++,
Ib(X;eY ) = 1: (SNM)
Axiom 3.9: Pair-based Decomposition 2. Let X;Y 2 D++ :







where f(¢) is continuous, and where CIb(xi;yj) is the contribution of the pair i;j to
the between-group inequality Ib(X;Y ).3
Theorem 3.2 A relative between-group inequality index Ib satis¯es SNM ´ fRS \





r=1 jxi ¡ yrj
n2(x + y)
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
G : ­ £ ­ ¡! [0;1] is Dagum's (1987) Gini index between two populations of
income receivers. The strong normalization yields G(X;Y ) 2 [0;1], that is, G(X;Y ) =
0 when the repartition of incomes is egalitarian, and G(X;Y ) = 1 when it is anti-
egalitarian.
Lemma 3.1 Let e X; e Y be two distributions obtained from two rank-ordered income
distributions X;Y by a between-group Pigou-Dalton transfer from xi 2 X to yj 2 Y .
({) 8X;Y 2 D++, G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y ) if, and only if, rxi=Y ¡ryj=X ¸ ¡1 and n ¸ m.
({{) 8X;Y 2 ­; G( e X; e Y ) < G(X;Y ).
Then, for groups with equal sizes, G(X;Y ) is strictly decreasing when a BPD
transfer occurs.
Now, let us turn to particular between Pigou-Dalton transfers, namely, between-
quantile transfers (BQT). BQT are performed from xi 2 X to yj 2 Y , such that
3DEC2 is a weaker requirement of DEC1. The fact that f is continuous enables one to choose
between increasing, decreasing or non-linear functions in order to weight di®erently each income
pairwise. This is left for future researches.
7xi > yj, xi¡1 · xi¡±, yj +± · yj+1, 8X;Y 2 ­, for which donors and recipients have
the same rank ri = rj.4
Theorem 3.3 Let X;Y 2 ­, and A be the matrix whose column entries are X and
Y , AT being the transpose of A and Ai the i-th column of A. If there exists a matrix
C obtained from A by a ¯nite sequence of between-quantile transfers, then :
({) G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y )
({{) C Á2 A, where Á2 is the (bivariate) majorization ordering
({{{) CT ¹n
L AT, where ¹n





i=1 Á(Ai), for all continuous convex functions Á : Rn ¡! R.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result enables one to derive some results conformably to Hardy, Littlewood
and P¶ olya's spirit, and to draw some connections between stronger between-group
Pigou-Dalton transfers and some existing concepts of dominance. On the one hand,
between-group quantile transfers imply multivariate stochastic dominance. Indeed,
each row of C (representing quantiles) is majorized by those of A. Instead of cha-
racterizing this dominance in a one-dimensional context, that is, with the traditional
Lorenz curve, a multivariate criterion is employed. Indeed, the majorization orde-
ring can be visualized with the Lorenz zonotope of CT (that is a particular poly-
tope of Rn+1), which is included in the Lorenz zonotope of AT.5 On the other hand,




® 1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® ®
¶
;® 2 [0;1]:
Any T¡transform is given by : T := ¸I + (1 ¡ ¸)Q, 0 · ¸ · 1, where I is the
identity matrix, and where Q is a permutation matrix that interchanges only two
coordinates. C is said to be chain majorized by A, that is, C 4 A, if C is given
by : C = AB where B is a product of T¡transforms. As chain majorization 4 is
equivalent to majorization Ád if, and only if, d = 2 (see Marshall and Olkin (1979),
A.2 p. 431), then G(X;Y ) can be seen as an order-preserving function. Indeed, as
G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y ) if ® 2 [0;1], then G(X;Y ) has a property similar to Schur
convexity, but in a bivariate context.
Theorem 3.4 Let X;Y be m £ n matrices. A di®erentiable function Á : Rmn ¡! R
satis¯es Á(X) · Á(Y ) for all X 4 Y if, and only if,
4Between-quantile transfers may also characterize mobility measures, for which income di®erences
are only computed between the quantiles of each group, see e.g. Fields and Ok (1996).
5The equivalence between Pigou-Dalton transfers and the concept of Lorenz dominance between
pairs of income distributions F and G is well established in the sense that there is less inequality
in distribution F if its corresponding Lorenz curve lies nowhere below that of G. This dominance
criterion is here extended in the dimension n+1, where the Lorenz zonotope is the natural extension
of the Lorenz curve (see Koshevoy and Mosler (1996)).












Furthermore, as G(X;Y ) respects the majorization ordering, the index possesses
the following property.
Theorem 3.5 Let X;Y be m £ n matrices. If X Án Y , then Á(X) · Á(Y ) for all
Á : Rmn ¡! R which are symmetric and convex in the sense that :
({) Á(X) · Á(X¦) for all n £ n permutation matrices ¦,
({{) Á(®X + (1 ¡ ®)Y ) · ®Á(X) + (1 ¡ ®)Á(Y ), 0 · ® · 1.
Proof. Marshall and Olkin (1979, C.3 p. 435).
In the case of within-group transfers, the symmetric result of Theorem (3.3) can
be obtained. Let us before expose an intermediate result.
Lemma 3.2 Let e X; e Y be two distributions issued from two rank-ordered income dis-
tributions X;Y 2 D+ by a within-group Pigou-Dalton transfer from xi 2 X to xj 2 X
and from yi 2 Y to yj 2 Y , thus : G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma (3.2) shows that G(X;Y ) respects the within-group Pigou-Dalton trans-
fers WPD2. The proofs of WPD and WPD1 are left for the reader.
Theorem 3.6 Let X;Y 2 ­ and A the matrix whose column entries are X and Y ,
AT being the transpose of A and ATi the i-th column of AT. If there exists a matrix
C obtained from A by a ¯nite sequence of within-group Pigou-Dalton transfers in X
and by a ¯nite sequence of within-group Pigou-Dalton transfers in Y , then :
({) G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y )
({{) CT Án AT, where Án is the (n-variate) majorization ordering
({{{) C ¹2
L A, where ¹2





i=1 Á(ATi), for all continuous convex functions Á : R2 ¡! R.
Proof. Analogous to Theorem (3.3).
The sequence of within-group Pigou-Dalton transfers is characterized by the pro-
duct CT = ATB, where B is an n £ n doubly stochastic matrix. The sum over any
given line or column of each element of B, bij 2 [0;1] is valued to be 1. In this case,
G( e X; e Y ) · G(X;Y ). On the contrary, when B is a doubly stochastic matrix but not
a permutation one, that is bij 2 (0;1), the respect of WPD2 is strict. In each case,
the majorization ordering CT Án AT is respected. This dominance criterion is cha-
racterized by the Lorenz zonotope of C which is included in that of A, the inclusion
being not strict whenever bij 2 [0;1].6
6See Horn and Johnson (1991, Theorem (4.3.33)) for the equivalence between the majorization
ordering and the existence of doubly stochastic matrices.
94 Application to the Gini Decomposition
As shown in the previous sections, the between-group Gini index is sensitive to
between-group Pigou-Dalton transfers. Then, a natural application to the Gini de-
composition is of some interest, since the between-group Gini index constitutes an
element of the well-known Gini coe±cient G.
The Gini decomposition has been extensively studied (see e.g. Battacharya and
Mahalanobis (1967), Rao (1969), Pyatt (1976), Silber (1989), Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1991), Lambert and Aronson (1993), Sastry and Kelkar (1994), Dagum (1997), Wo-
don (1999), Aaberge, Steinar, Doksum (2005) among others) but few of these re-
searches yield a full characterization of the Gini index with respect to the nature
of the transfers. Transfers are usually invoked in order to ensure Schur convexity
to be ful¯lled for overall indices, that is, overall inequality declines with progres-
sive transfers. Nevertheless, this is made without apprehending neither the impact
of within-group transfers nor that of between-group transfers on global inequality,
whereas the overall index is a weighted average of within- and between-group indices.
Let xik be the income of the i-th individual i 2 f1;2;:::;ng of the group ¦k with
k;j 2 f1;2;:::;Kg. Let ¹ and ¹k be respectively the income average of the overall





r=1 jxi ¡ xrj
2n2¹
:
The within-group Gini index of group ¦k and the Gini index between the groups ¦k












r=1 jxik ¡ xrjj
nknj(¹k + ¹j)
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where pk and sk are respectively population share of group k (
nk
n ) and income share
of group k (
nk¹k
n¹ ).
Proof. See Dagum (1997).
Remark that this two-term decomposition follows directly from the pair-based de-





, where CG(xi;xj) =
jxi¡xjj
2n2¹ , and where f(x) = x. Brin-
ging together the income pairs within each group (Gw) and the income pairs between
each group pairwise (Ggb) yields a within-group Gini index and a gross between-group
10Gini index. It is well-known that the Gini index is decomposable in three components :
the within-group element (Gw) plus the (gross) between-group element (Ggb), which
is in turn decomposed into between-group inequalities (Gnb) measuring inequalities
between the mean incomes of the distribution of each group, and a transvariational
element (Gt) that gauges inequalities of overlap between these distributions. For sim-
plicity and without loss of generality, we focus on the two-term Gini decomposition
(1).7 This approach avoids to impose a crude structure to the between-group index
and nonsensical responses to within- and between-group transfers (see Section 5).
Theorem 4.2 Let e G and G be respectively ex-post and ex-ante Gini coe±cients com-
puted on the overall population. The same distinction applies for Gw, e Gw and Ggb, e Ggb.
If e Xk; e Xj 2 D+ are obtained from Xk;Xj by a between-group Pigou-Dalton transfer
from xik 2 Xk of group ¦k to xrj 2 Xj of group ¦j, then :
({) e G < G, e Gw < Gw, e Ggb < Ggb if rxik > rxrj and rxik=Xj ¸ rxrj=Xk ¡ 1,
({{) e G < G, e Gw > Gw, e Ggb < Ggb if rxik < rxrj and rxik=Xj ¸ rxrj=Xk ¡ 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fact that a progressive transfer diminishes the overall Gini index is a well-
known result. Nevertheless, it is not clear how may vary inequalities within groups
and between groups in accordance with the nature of the transfers. In Theorem (4.2),
di®erent scenarios of between-group transfers are itemized. ({) There is simultaneously
less within-group and less between-group inequalities. ({{) There is more within-group
inequalities, which are compensated for lower between-group inequalities.8
Theorem 4.3 Let e Xk; e Xj 2 D+ being obtained from Xk;Xj by a within-group Pigou-
Dalton transfer from xik 2 Xk to xrk 2 Xk and from xij 2 Xj to xrj 2 Xj. Then :
({) e G < G, e Gw < Gw, e Ggb < Ggb if 9` 2 f1;2;:::;nkg, 9t 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : xik < x`t <
xrk and/or 9z 2 f1;2;:::;nkg, 9h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : xij < xzh < xrj.
({{) e G < G, e Gw < Gw, e Ggb = Ggb if @` 2 f1;2;:::;nkg, @t 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : xik < x`t <
xrk and @z 2 f1;2;:::;nkg, @h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : xij < xzh < xrj.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Lemma (3.2), the Gini index between two groups Gkj diminishes if a foreign
person lies between the donor and the recipient. Consequently, the overall inequality
declines : ({) with less within-group and less between-group inequalities, or ({{) with
less within-group inequalities only.9
7Rao's (1969) Gini decomposition was the ¯rst attempt de¯ning a between-group inequality mea-
sure di®erently from a simple index that measures the di®erences between mean incomes only. Dagum
(1997) extends this idea and proves notably that G(X;Y ) captures variance and asymmetrical e®ects
between groups, whereas other measures fail.
8Remember that the condition imposed on the conditional ranks can be dropped if Xj;Xk 2 ­,
see Lemma (3.1).
9Theorem (4.3) does not deal with WPD1 and WPD2. Obviously, we obtain the same results.
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The generalized entropy index I¯ (see e.g. Shorrocks (1980), Cowell (1980)) is a














; ¯ 2 R: (2)
The generalized entropy is decomposed such as : I¯ = I¯w + I¯b, where I¯w and I¯b
stand respectively for within- and between-group entropy measures, the latter being
a function of the number of persons in each group nk, k 2 f1;:::;Kg and on the
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Equation (4) is derived from the additive decomposability axiom (see Shorrocks
(1980)) postulating that each individual earns the mean income of his correspon-
ding group. The generalized entropy comprises the well-known Theil index (¯ ! 0),
Hirschman-Her¯ndahl index (¯ ! 1), and Bourguignon index (¯ ! ¡1). In the
points described infra, we expose some limitations underlying the use of between-
group measures equivalent to I¯b.
({) I¯b is invariant to within-group Pigou-Dalton transfers (WPD, WPD1, WPD2)
since it preserves the mean income of the group in which transfers occur (see Table
1). Contrary to this, G(Xh;Xk) is decreasing (not strictly), because the income re-
partition resulting from WPD, e.g. in group ¦h, may produce some perturbations
in group ¦k. This perturbation may incorporate a concern for more exclusion, more
deprivation, or more envy expressed from the members of ¦k.
({{) Imagine a progressive transfer of amount ± > 0 from a higher-income indivi-
dual of group ¦k to a lower-income one of ¦h, coupled with a progressive transfer of
the same amount from a higher-income person of ¦h to a lower-income one of ¦k. Ob-
viously, this type of transfer does not a®ect the mean income of each group, namely,
the principle of between-group Pigou-Dalton transfers which are mean-preserving
(BPDMP, see Table 1). If the mean incomes remain unchanged, there is no reason to
record no variation of between-group inequalities. Even so, I¯b is always silent about
¯nite sequences of BPDMP. On the contrary, G(Xh;Xk) is decreasing.
({{{) When a progressive between-group Pigou-Dalton transfer is itemized between
groups ¦h and ¦k, in a given quantile (BQT), I¯b increases or decreases, whereas
G(Xh;Xk) is systematically decreasing.
12({v) Suppose ¹h < ¹k and nh = nk and assume that a progressive between-group
Pigou-Dalton transfer occurs from xih of ¦h to xrk of ¦k. As xih > xrk but ¹h < ¹k, the
transfer increases I¯b. This violates the BPD axiom and may violate our basic intuition
of between-group inequality measurement. The condition one has to impose to get a
reducing I¯b is that the donor must belong to the group with higher mean income.
This does make sense in some circumstances, but it is a too demanding requirement
(included in BPD). In this particular case, the overall index I¯ decreases, but it is
always a one-way decline : e I¯w < I¯w and e I¯b > I¯b with I¯w ¡ e I¯w > e I¯b ¡ I¯b. On
the contrary, G(Xh;Xk) is systematically decreasing, implying e Ggb < Ggb. This may
occur either with e Gw < Gw or with e Gw > Gw, since a between-group transfer changes
the income repartition in the donor's group as well as in the recipient's one.
Table 1. Within-group and Between-group Pigou-Dalton transfers¤¤
Transfers !
Indices # WPD WPD1 WPD2 BPD BPDMP BQT
G(Xh;Xk) · · · < < <
Ggb · · · < < <
Gw < < < < or > < or > < or >
I¯b = = = < or > = < or >
I¯w < < < < or > < < or >
¤ For simplicity, assume groups with equal sizes : Xh;Xk 2 ­.
¤¤ · : decreasing or equal (< decreasing) after transfer.
¤¤ ¸ : increasing or equal (> increasing) after transfer.
¤¤ = : invariant after transfer.
Actually, the additive decomposability yields I¯b for which the income distribu-
tions of each group are obtained with ¯nite sequences of within-group transfers in
each group (WPD2). This allows to achieve egalitarian (but not necessarily identical)
income distributions. Then, using I¯b to address empirical applications can be seen
as a particular exercise.10 Furthermore, as I¯b is not sensitive to WPD transfers (see
the line I¯b in Table 1), if we assume by duality that the welfare counterpart of I¯b is
also invariant, then we do not match all intuitive results developed by Chateauneuf
et al. (2002) about decision making under risk and uncertainty.
Finally, the use of pair-based decomposability (DEC1/DEC2) confers the ability to
perform inequality-reducing tax reforms by taxing one group and using the proceeds
to subsidize another group. Then, in the spirit of Hardy, Littlewood and P¶ olya's
works (1929, 1934, 1952), the pair-based decomposability allows one to address a close
interrelation between : between/within-group transfers, the majorization ordering,
the multivariate Lorenz ordering, and Schur convexity in the sense of Rinott's (1973)
theorem.
10Moreover, the additive decomposability is not the unique way to decompose entropy indices.
Indeed, DEC2 may be adapted for the squared coe±cient of variation (I¯, ¯ ! 1), since it comprises
all pairs of squared income di®erences.
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Proof. Theorem (3.1) :
(Necessity). The demonstration goes along the line the literature we ¯nd on dis-
tance measures (see Dagum (1980), Chakravarty and Dutta (1987), Ebert (1984))
or deprivation measures (Ebert and Moyes (2000), Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2006)).
Consider there exists a measure g that satis¯es INV, LIN, SM, NM and DEC1. Let
X 2 Rn
+ and Y 2 Rm
+, for all n;m ¸ 2 with xi 2 X, xr 2 X and yj 2 Y . Sup-
pose xi = xr, then g(xi;Y ) = g(xr;Y ). Let us restrict the distribution Y to the
j-th person. Then, there exists an elementary function Á : R+ £ R+ ! R+ such
that : g = Á(xi;yj) = Á(xr;yj). By INV, we get : Á(xi;yj) = Á(xi + ±;yj + ±).
Let ± := ¡xi such that xi > yj, this entails : Á(xi;yj) = Á(0;xi ¡ yj). As Á(¢)
has to be de¯ned over positive reals, if xi < yj, Á(xi;yj) = Á(0;yj ¡ xi). In both
cases, if ¸ := 1
xi¡yj or ¸ := 1
yj¡xi by LIN we obtain : Á(xi;yj) = (yj ¡ xi)Á(0;1) or
Á(xi;yj) = (xi ¡ yj)Á(1;0). By SM and NM, we get Á(0;1) = Á(1;0) = 1. Again by
SM, for all xi < yj or xi > yj, we obtain : Á(xi;yj) = jxi ¡ yjj, which is the well-
known one-dimensional HÄ olderian distance function. From DEC1, we know that each
xi is compared with yj for all j 2 f1;2;:::;mg. Then, comparing xi and yj for all j
together with NM gives : g(xi;Y ) =
Pm
j=1 jxi¡yjj
m . Always from DEC1, repeating the










j=1 jxi ¡ yjj implies
h(X(t);Y (t)) = t2 Pn
i=1
Pm
j=1 jxi ¡ yjj, 8t ¸ 2. On the other hand, the normaliza-
tion function f(x) := x
n is relevant since after t concatenations, it is f(x(t)) = x
t2n.
Consequently, the axiom NM characterized by f(¢) implies the respect of PP. The
reverse is not true. Consider we normalize h(X;Y ) by f(x) := x
kn with k 2 R+. This
normalization implies that PP is satis¯ed for all k 2 R whereas NM is only available





j=1 jxi ¡ yjj
nm
:
(Su±ciency). We can obviously verify that GMD(¢) satis¯es all axioms.
(Independence). In order to have a relevant i® axiomatic derivation, the axioms
must be independent. We must ¯nd ¯ve di®erent indices that satisfy all axioms but













Remark that GMD1(X;Y ) does not satisfy INV if, and only if, (X;Y ) 6= (1x;1y)















jxi ¡ yjj (not NM)












i=1 jxi ¡ yij
n
(not DEC1)
Proof. Theorem (3.2) :
(Necessity) Let us suppose there exists a measure of between-group inequality
Ib satisfying SNM, SM, DEC2, and BPD. SNM is the intersection of NM and RS.
As SNM =) RS, Euler's functional equation for homogeneous functions applies (see
Acz¶ el (1966, p. 239)). Indeed from,
F(xz;yz) = z
kF(x;y);8z 6= 0;
follows the equations :
















From SNM, we have k = 0 and from DEC2, it is possible to focus on two individuals






;8xi 6= 0. Suppose yj = 0, then from SNM

















Then, the function F(xi;yj) = xi ¡ yj holds. From SM, this reduces to :
F(xi;yj) = jxi ¡ yjj;8xi = 1;yj = 0: (A2)
Invoking SNM again, we must have F(xi;0) = 1;8xi 6= 0. This requires F(xi;yj) being
normalize in di®erent ways. Remember that from SNM we have Y = Oy, and X = 1x
such that F(eX;Y ) = 1 for all e 2 R++. Always from SNM we can impose xi = ¹ x,
15where ¹ x is the arithmetic mean of X. Then, from SNM, four solutions consistent with
(A1) and (A2) are :
F(xi;yj) =
8
> > > > <









Now, invoking DEC2, we must be able to compute the contribution of F(xi;yj) to
Ib(X;Y ). Remember that DEC2 comprises n £ m income pairs, then repeating all
possible comparisons together with SNM yields :
CF(xi;yj) =
8
> > > > <









DEC2 together with SNM gives Ib(X;Y ) =
P
i;j CF(xi;yj), and then f(x) = x,
implying the following class of inequality measures :
Ib (CF(xi;yj)) =
8
> > > > <















Imagine a progressive BPD transfer of amount ± > 0 occurs from xi to yj (xi > yi),
such that ¹ x < ¹ y. As CF3(xi;yj) =
j¹ x¡¹ yj
xi+yj and CF4(xi;yj) =
j¹ x¡¹ yj
¹ x+¹ y violate BPD, we can
restrict our attention to the other ones. Again from BPD, our class of inequality mea-
sures reduces to Ib (CF2(X;Y )), such that n = m, that is, 8X;Y 2 ­. In consequence,







n2 (¹ x + ¹ y)
;8X;Y 2 ­:
(Su±ciency) G(X;Y ) satis¯es SNM, SM, DEC2, and BPD (for the latter, see the


















n2 (¹ x ¡ ¹ y)















n2 (xi + yj)
(not BPD)
Proof. Lemma (3.1) : For the demonstration, one needs to introduce the concept
of conditional rank. The conditional rank of an individual rxi=Y is the rank of xi if he
belonged to Y . Let ryi=X be the conditional rank of yi in X.
(Necessity ({)). Let us decompose the numerator of G(X;Y ) in order to obtain
the set S of all pair-based income di®erences :
S =
8
> > > <
> > > :
jx1 ¡ y1j; jx1 ¡ y2j ;:::; jx1 ¡ ymj





jxn ¡ y1j; jxn ¡ y2j ;:::; jxn ¡ ymj
9
> > > =
> > > ;
:
If a between-group Pigou-Dalton transfer occurs from xi 2 X to yj 2 Y , then the set
of pair-based income di®erences is :
e S =
½
jxi ¡ ± ¡ y1j; jxi ¡ ± ¡ y2j ;:::; jxi ¡ yj ¡ 2±j ;:::; jxi ¡ ± ¡ yk+1j ;:::; jxi ¡ ± ¡ ymj;




jxi ¡ y1j ¡ ±; jxi ¡ y2j ¡ ± ;:::; jxi ¡ yjj ¡ 2± ;:::; jxi ¡ yk+1j + ± ;:::; jxi ¡ ymj + ±;
jyj ¡ x1j + ±; jyj ¡ x2j + ± ;:::; jyj ¡ xsj + ± ;:::; jyj ¡ x`+1j ¡ ± ;:::; jyj ¡ xnj ¡ ±
¾
:
For a BPD transfer from xi to yj with rxi=Y = k and ryj=X = `, a simple computation
gives the variation of the numerator of G(X;Y ) : ±(2`¡n+1)¡±(2k ¡m+1)¡2±.
The BPD transfer implies : nm(e x+ e y) = nm(x¡ ±
n +y + ±
m) > nm(x+y). If n = m,











r=1 jxi ¡ yrj + ±(2` ¡ n + 1) ¡ ±(2k ¡ m + 1) ¡ 2±
nm(x + y) + nm(¡ ±
n + ±
m)
=: G( e X; e Y ):











r=1 jxi ¡ yrj + ±(2` ¡ n + 1) ¡ ±(2k ¡ m + 1) ¡ 2±
nm(x + y) + nm(¡ ±
n + ±
m)
=: G( e X; e Y ):
(Su±ciency ({)). Let k ¡ ` < ¡1 and n < m =) G( e X; e Y ) > G(X;Y ).
17({{) It can be noticed that a between-group Pigou-Dalton transfer from xi to
yj, such that xi > yj and X;Y 2 ­, systematically implies rxi=Y > ryj=X. Hence,
G( e X; e Y ) < G(X;Y ). In consequence, for distributions with equal sizes, the restriction
imposed on conditional ranks can be dropped and the respect of BPD is strict.
Proof. Lemma (3.2) :
Without loss of generality, suppose a within-group Pigou-Dalton transfer (WPD)
occurring between xi;xi¡1 2 X. We then obtain the set of binary income di®erences :
e Sk =
½
jxi ¡ ± ¡ y1j; jxi ¡ ± ¡ y2j ;:::; jxi ¡ ± ¡ yjj jxi ¡ ± ¡ yj+1j ;:::; jxi ¡ ± ¡ ymj




jxi ¡ y1j + ±; jxi ¡ y2j + ± ;:::; jxi ¡ yjj + ± jxi ¡ yj+1j ¡ ± ;:::; jxi ¡ ymj ¡ ±
jxi¡1 ¡ y1j ¡ ±; jxi¡1 ¡ y2j ¡ ± ;:::; jxi¡1 ¡ yjj ¡ ± jxi ¡ yj+1j + ± ;:::; jxi¡1 ¡ ymj + ±
¾
:
Imagine that 9yj : xi¡1 < yj < xi < yj+1, j 2 f1;:::;mg. Then, the variation of
the numerator of G(X;Y ) is ¡2± (the denominator being constant). By induction,
if b individuals are positioned in the ladder between the donor xi and the receiver
xi¡1, the variation is ¡2b±. The same reasoning applies when a WPD transfer occurs
between yi and yi¡1 and if 9xj : yi¡1 < xj < yi, j 2 f1;:::;ng. Now consider both
WPD transfers. As the WPD transfer preserves individuals' ranking, if there exists
at least one person between the donor and the bene¯ciary (in X and in Y ), then
G( e X; e Y ) < G(X;Y ).
Clearly, if @yj : xi¡1 < yj < xi, j 2 f1;:::;mg, then a WPD transfer from xi
to xi¡1 implies that the number of ¡± necessarily equals that of ± and, G( e X; e Y ) =
G(X;Y ).
The same reasoning applies for a transfer within Y (WPD1) or a transfer occurring
both in X and in Y simultaneously (WPD2).
Proof. Theorem (3.3) :
The between-quantile transfers are characterized by doubly stochastic matrices.
Any set of doubly stochastic matrices is a compact convex set, which is determined
by the envelope of its extreme points. By Birkho®'s theorem (see Marshall and Olkin
(1979, A.2, p. 19), extreme points of any doubly stochastic matrix are given by all
permutation matrices. The doubly stochastic matrices B are expressed as :
B =
µ
® 1 ¡ ®















Then, the convex hull is simply a line segment without extremities in R4. Remark that
the B matrices are also denominated T¡transforms (see Marshall and Olkin (1979, p.






®x1 + (1 ¡ ®)y1 (1 ¡ ®)x1 + ®y1
. . .
. . .




We obtain C = ( e X; e Y ), for all 0:5 < ® < 1 and C = (e Y ; e X) for all 0 < ® < 0:5. For
® = 0:5, we obtain identical distributions : e X = e Y . In both cases, the between-group
Pigou-Dalton transfer is respected since : e x1 · e x2 · ::: · e xn and e y1 · e y2 · ::: · e yn.
({). Between-quantile transfers from xi 2 X to yi 2 Y with xi ¸ yi imply rxi=Y ¸
ryi=Y . Symmetrically, between-quantile transfers from yi 2 Y to xi 2 X yi ¸ xi
imply ryi=X ¸ rxi=X. Remember that G(X;Y ) is a symmetric function. Then, for all
® 2 (0;1), the desired result is provided by Lemma (3.1). For ® = 0 and ® = 1,
G( e X; e Y ) = G(X;Y ).
({{). Following Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 430), for all n£d matrices A;C 2 Rnd,
C is said to be majorized by A, that is C Ád A, if C = AB, where B is a d£d doubly
stochastic matrix. Note that, C is said to be chain majorized by A, C 4 A, if C is
obtained by A by a ¯nite product of d £ d T¡transforms. Any T¡transform yields
exactly a Pigou-Dalton transfer and chain majorization is equivalent to majorization
if, and only if, d = 2 (see Marshall and Olkin (1979), p. 431). Note here that majori-
zation is concerned with the rows of matrices A and C in the sense that each row of
C (each rank or each quantile) is less spread out than the corresponding row of A.
({{{). To prove n-variate Lorenz dominance, we have to compute geometrical Lo-
renz ¯gures in Rd+1, that is, Lorenz zonotopes LZ(¢), which are convex polytopes
(see Koshevoy and Mosler (1996)). Let X;Y 2 Rnd
+ . X dominates Y in the sense of
d¡variate Lorenz dominance if LZ(X) ½ LZ(Y). In other terms, X ¹d
L Y if the
Lorenz zonotope of X is a subset of the Lorenz zonotope of Y in Rd+1. As explained
in Koshevoy and Mosler (2005), the Lorenz zonotope LZ(¢) is equivalent to the lift























Let b Xi be the i-th row of b X, then LZ(X) = b Z(b X) = 1
n
Pn




i=1[(0;Od);(1; b Xi)] is a Minkowski sum. Following the between-quantile transfer,
no implication can be found on the Lorenz zonotopes LZ(C) and LZ(A). On the
contrary, between-quantile transfers systematically imply LZ(CT) ½ LZ(AT) in Rn+1.
























i and c CT
i stand respectively for the i-th row of c AT and c CT, we have :
LZ(A















As the Minkowski sum yields the Lorenz zonotope by adding the sets points by
points, and as the vector (1; c CT
i ) is always closer to the main diagonal of the unit
hypercube of Rn+1 than the vector (1; c AT
i ), then LZ(CT) ½ LZ(AT) if, and only
if, ® 2 (0;1): Consequently, CT ¹n
L AT. Equivalently, Koshevoy and Mosler (2005)
advanced other properties for zonotope inclusions : if the matrices have the same rank
(rk(AT) = rk(CT)), then CT ¹n
L AT if each column CiT dominates AiT. Remark that
the 2 £ 2 doubly stochastic matrices, which may be permutation matrices (that is,
for all ® 2 [0;1]), only give weak inclusion, or equivalently, weak n-variate Lorenz
dominance.
({v). See Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 433).
Proof. Theorem (4.2) :
({). A transfer from xik 2 Xk 2 Rnk to xrj 2 Xj 2 Rnj declines the overall Gini
index e G < G (from the well-known Pigou-Dalton property). The transfer implies a
within-group variation, precisely, a transformation of the inequalities within ¦k and
¦j. These variations are computed via the following sets :
e Sk =
©













jxrj ¡ x1jj + ±; jxrj ¡ x2jj + ± ;:::; jxrj ¡ xrjj; jxrj ¡ xr+1jj ¡ ± ;:::; ;:::; jxrj ¡ xnjjj ¡ ±
ª
:
We see that a necessary condition to obtain a number of ¡± higher than a number
of ± in each group is rxik=Xk > rxrj=Xj =) e Gw < Gw.
Let us now analyze the implications of the between-group transfer on the other
distributions. First, the implication of the income donor xik when he is compared
with members of the other groups ¦h such that xrh 2 Xh, h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg n fkg :
e Skh =
©




jxik ¡ x1hj ¡ ±; jxik ¡ x2hj ¡ ± ;:::; jxik ¡ xrhj ¡ ± jxik ¡ xr+1hj + ± ;:::; jxik ¡ xnhhj + ±
ª
;
Second, the implication of the income bene¯ciary xrj 2 Xj when he is compared
with members of the other groups ¦h such that xrh 2 Xh, h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg n fjg :
20e Sjh =
©




jxrj ¡ x1hj + ±; jxrj ¡ x2hj + ± ;:::; jxrj ¡ xrhj; jxrj ¡ xr+1hj ¡ ± ;:::; ;:::; jxrj ¡ xnhhj ¡ ±
ª
:
A necessary condition to obtain more ¡± than ± is : rxik=Xh > rxrj=Xh, 8k 6= h;8j 6=
h;h 2 f1;:::;Kg, that is, the donor possesses a higher conditional rank in each
distribution than the receiver. This is systematically respected since xik > xrj. Third,
we must analyze the implication of the between-group transfer on the inequalities
between ¦k and ¦j. From Lemma (3.1), the donor's conditional rank must be rxik=Xj ¸
rxrj=Xk ¡ 1. It then follows that : e Ggb < Ggb.
({{). Analogous to ({).
Proof. Theorem (4.3) :
({) We know, for any given Pigou-Dalton transfer, that : e G < G. In consequence,
if a standard Pigou-Dalton transfer occurs in ¦k and in ¦j : we have e Gw < Gw. And
from Lemma (3.2), it follows that e Ggb < Ggb.
({{) Analogous to ({).
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